lunedì 30 marzo 2015

Islamic State and the Black Dorsal.

The time has come to make order in the riser and redundant media flow of news that not always becomes information.
First news: what is happening in the contemporary world is of great interest in its global dimension, but precisely because of this to most people seems distant from the daily interests; it is not the case.
Second news, bad: we are not yet prepared to deal with the related threats as we do not always understand the genesis, development and dynamics of the new world.
Third news, encouraging: at least we are talking about it.
Trying to make order we start with the general profiles. The contemporary world is characterized by chaos and no sovereign state has the power to control global developments.
The Middle East, with the collapse of Syria and Iraq, is destabilized to the point that the situation will have clear impact even beyond the Mesopotamia; Libya and Yemen are in a panic, Lebanon and Israel live in a constant state of war; the Arab Spring did not bring any benefit to the local people; Afghanistan and Pakistan can sink into a similar abyss at all times; Europe has the war on its borders, and is not equipped to deal with; the whole of Africa is under constant pressure from inside by the hand of the endogenous onset and from the voracious hunger for exploitation of its resources by the international powers; the Pacific has returned to being an ocean "of war" because of commercial interests that trigger appetites of all the countries surrounding it; Asia is under pressure from China who returned to feel threatened by Japan and Russia.
This is essentially the geopolitical referenced national forces, supranational and imperial.
However, to produce effects for social security is the lower level of international relations, theater tactics staged by great actors. The interventions of this nature, in the various regional theaters of China, Russia, America, India, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, between the main, are obviously functional national priorities.
In this scenario acts the Islamic State surpassing the strategy of al-Qaeda, which is anyway the direct filiation, establishing itself as an advanced model for contemporary jihad fought with the same weapons of the Western enemy: the exploitation of mass media and the regional crises.
The Islamic State, unlike al-Qaeda, has created an idea of ​​belonging enticing for young people, not by chance the privileged recipients of his communication, combined with a reaffirmation of the original spirit of a united Islam as in the heyday of the first four caliphs.
From a strategic point was the Syrian Abu Musab al-Suri (Syrian naturalized Spaniard formed in London in the school's ideological Palestinian Abu Qatada before reaching al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan) to outline the guidelines for a jihad no longer based on a rigid organization but as articulated on a flexible network. I resort, in an attempt to one evocative representation, the metaphor of the spider's web that even if he fail a thread of the plot does not lose its deadly potential of the whole. Is in this context that should be understood the attacks made by cells or lone-wolf.
These attacks represent the first step towards the destabilization of a region in order to generate local onset, relying on local specificities, as happened in Iraq and Syria yesterday, today in Libya and perhaps in Tunisia, and probably also at this time Yemen.
Corollary of the seduction exercised by the Islamic State is the growing movement of foreign fighters, the phenomenon still not well defined, but no less of extreme danger in relation to the potential multiplier effect of acceptances.
Finally, the idea of ​​this new Jihad, is well suited to be married by local insurgents and terrorist because of their specific needs so that claiming membership in the caliphate of al-Baghdadi creating de facto a "Black Dorsal" that now extends from Iraq to Libya (Ansar al Sharia in the province of Derna where he has been created a youth jihadist movement) but that goes will go further to Nigeria of Boko haram and Somalia of Shaabab.
This is the picture of the world certainly limited to the  Western point of view.
However, the real news in an absolute sense, even more than the described evolution of jihad, is that for the first time in absolute is the new menace carried out by the relationship between organized crime terrorism and insurgency sharing common interests even with differents goals.
This aspect is the essential point for understanding the dynamics of the Islamic State jihadi because without the support of the local tribes, who exercise control of the territories in most Islamic societies, it is not possible to further establish the caliphate as it has made in Iraq, Syria and still partly in Libya.
The control of the territory generates income essential for the Islamic State which in turn grants to local criminals the opportunity to continue in their illegal activities.
Is in this relationship and joint interest that should be identified the greatest danger posed by the Islamic State and his followers because this relationship generates resilience, i.e. ability to react and adapt to external attacks, as demonstrated by the Model Criminal Mafioso shown in previous writings.
If the territories accept this then no external intervention can remedy a factual situation as teaches Italian experience.
The question then is: why these territories should not give in to the lure of the idea advocated by the Islamic State?