Libya is also afflicted by the contagion revolution that shook the Arab Middle East and Mediterranean, from Algeria to Iran, causing the end of the Tunisian regime of Ben Ali and Mubarak of Egypt.
This revolution, however, beyond some characteristic features such as the role of social networks, the urban nature of the insurgency, the defections in the ranks of the various state apparatuses and security in favor of the rebel forces, has shown some characteristics from the beginning that distinguish it from similar events that occurred in the Middle East.
First, the intensity of the clashes between the forces in revolt and the government has now clearly surpassed that which has characterized the tension between police and demonstrators both in Tahrir Square in Cairo and along the streets of Tunis.
The rioters, in response, mainly in Cyrenaica, stormed the barracks ransacked armories until he established a militia irregular able to cope with the army controlling the territory liberated from the oppression of government. They, as a sign of clear distinction identirtaria, use the flag as a symbol of the Kingdom of Libya in opposition to the Republican banner introduced after the coup of 1969.
The social structure Libyan highly fragmented and based on a tribal system, and this revolution can also be seen as a clash between the major tribes in the race to the central power. The tribal membership is a very strong political and anthropological factors and, in Libya, is reflected, in part, and hierarchies in the various state apparatuses.
Colonel Gaddafi Qadhadhfa belongs to the tribe, the smallest and weakest of the country but whose members hold positions of prestige and leadership roles in both the military and energy companies in the state.
The tribes of strategic importance for the Rais are, Saadi, once a supporter of the royal dynasty of Senussi, and the Magariha Warfalla. The latter, in particular, both coalition in the 1969 coup that gave power to the Colonel, but soon excluded from key roles of the new organization of power.
Today the conflict between the various tribes, of course, has not only social reasons related to access to the management of power, but also highly economical. One of the first regional leader to have declared war on the Colonel was, in fact, Akram Al-Warfalli, more powerful and charismatic leader of the tribe of Libyan Warfalla with about one million people representing a sixth of the Libyan population. The choices of the leaders of this tribe will be very important for the future balance in Libya. In this context, it is worth recalling that this tribe belonged to the 55 soldiers in October 1993 attempted coup which was followed by retaliatory violence a reaction against the power of the entire tribe. Following this episode, the Libyan parliament launched in 1997 the law of the "Code of Honor" which is extended to the whole tribe to fault the individual in such cases.
On 20 February, a council of tribal elders Warfalla, speaking on behalf of the entire confederation of tribes Warfalla, issued a statement harshly condemning the entire entourage for the Gaddafi reaction to the riots.
The religious element is clearly subject to the tribal dimension of the conflict due to the absence at this time scenario revolutionary Libyan radical Islamic force. This lack is due to the dual strategy undertaken in the past against religion by Gaddafi: marginalization of madrassas and nationalization of worship in support of the ideology of the United States according to nationalist socialism united in opposition to the tribal divisions.
At this time the Libyan political leadership is divided into: conservative, loyal to Qadhafi, reformists, led by the eldest son, Saafi Qaid al-Islam Gaddafi, which, although faithful to the dictates of Jamahirya intends to modernize and, finally, the technocrats, a group linked exclusively economic interests of SOEs.
The stabilization of Libya for Italy is a top priority because of several factors, first among the other economic exchanges and the spatial proximity with obvious effects on migration flows. Libya, constituting the end of a major African migration route from Africa to Europe has used this flow of dispossessed as a weapon of blackmail against Italy and, consequently, of European policies.
Economic relations between Italy and Libya have been subjected to a new configuration and momentum in the legal framework of the Treaty of Friendship of 2008 and the Treaty of Benghazi in 2009 in which are inserted into shares of the LIA (Libyan Investment Authority) in the industrial and Italian banks such as Eni, Finmeccanica, Fiat and Unicredit. In addition, the African country is still our main supplier of crude oil and the third largest supplier of gas and more than 100 national companies operating in that territory. Finally, the beautiful country is the leading European supplier of weapons to Libya.
The opposition forces, the National Council and the Coalition Revolutionary criticize the work of the Rais and the current system of Jamahirya, and may enter into negotiations with the reformists and Saafi al-Islam Gaddafi, provided that it is able to win the support of his brother Khamis and technocrats. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the departure of Colonel could be negotiated with his own tribe of origin.
Since, to date, very marginal role of political pacification, and the subsequent normalization process, will also rely on the involvement of tribal and ethnic leaders to their participation in state-run dynamics.
The ongoing revolution in Libya appears to be the physiological rebellion of one section of society to a state of things perpetratosi too long time pace of international supporters.
Within this general framework, it is interesting, finally, reflect on the contemporary explosion of the revolutions in these countries on the southern shore of Mare Nostrum. The recent Egyptian and Tunisian experience shows us that, in fact, to date, authoritarian systems have fallen only thanks to the support of the military forces of their countries, and Libya appears to continue on this vein, albeit with some differences due to the loyalty of departments selected loyal to Rais.
The question is therefore whether or not it is, in essence, to have provided a superficial change with the elimination of old leaders, no longer able to ensure stability over time, exploiting the legitimate popular grievances and the equally legitimate claims democratic.
Change everything so that nothing changes.