di Antonio De Bonis
pubblicato su www.cesi-italia.org
In Mexico, the drug war continues to live an unprecedented season of blood. This war has its roots in military defeat in the 90s, of the Colombian cartels of Medellin and Cali drug traffickers. The authorities of the Republic of Colombia, also due to the pressure exerted by the international community and its active contribution, have dismantled these two powerful organizations involved in global management of the cocaine produced in the Andean area. The ephemeral success achieved by the Colombian authorities has led to a momentary power vacuum that has been filled by other actors such as imposing the laws of the market. This logic has worked as a driving force for the explosive growth of economic power, military, of the two major criminal syndicates operating in Mexico in those years: the Sinaloa and the Gulf Cartel. The two cartels controlled and still control part of the eastern side, the Gulf cartel, and west to Sinaloa, the Mexican Sierra Madre. Both have quickly taken advantage of the role assigned to them the facts Colombians taking the opportunity to grow from mere facilitators of traffic in the territory to drug traffickers by taking control of much of the criminal chain, relegating the Colombian organizations to manage exclusively the production of cocaine. In economic terms, this involved the acquisition of money flows that have caused terrible appetites by potential competitors. To guard against any opposing organizations, the Gulf cartel, for one, warned this emergency. Lacking time and know how co-opted into its service a group of Mexican military deserters, the Los Zetas. The entry of the Los Zetas drug on the scene has triggered a new dynamic that has led, today, the other signs to eliminate the Confederation for the new entrant. The military unit of the Los Zetas was established in 1994 as a corps of elite Mexican Army to counter the outbreak in the state of Chiapas. For this purpose we selected a few tens of elements of the Mexican army special units. Chiapas is a Mexican state of great importance for the transit of cocaine from Andean countries to producers in Mexico and then to world markets. In this context, then, having fulfilled the job of counter insurgency in Chiapas, in 1999, most members of Los Zetas defected offering its services to the Gulf Cartel that had the primary need to ensure protection of their trafficking from the appetites of other criminal organizations. The operational area covered criminal organization in Mexico, the entire coast of the homonymous gulf, south side of the border with Texas and dozens of cities in states including New York. The name of the unit, which stemmed from the last letter of the name of their commander, was kept in its new criminal because the letter Z is the identifier of the municipal police radio in Mexico, as a way to emphasize the control of the territory by operating Los Zetas in symbiosis with the corrupt local police. The organization of the unit, modeled on the military adapts to new needs. Underlying operating Hawks acting as lookouts, the NEW COBRA or L, that do the work of laborers criminal, the COBRA ELDERLY taking over the new cobra, the new Los Zetas to which are added elements of Kaibiles, Guatemaltecan special forces, and finally to Los Zetas ELDERLY top of the pyramid of command. The weapons being given priority AK-47, G3, M-16, Barret M82, MP5 and HKP7. The structure employs a manager for each plaza which is in turn are supported by an adviser, an accountant and a safety officer. The Los Zetas operate moving in a typical formation known as The Estaca, it is an auto-patrol with four or five different elements of the operational level and whose commander is usually a senior Los Zetas.
In Mexico, given the relative newness of the general phenomenon of the exploitation of the cocaine market and the still immature and unprofessional of criminal structures, the balance between criminal factions involved has not yet been reached and the resulting pax mafia index of this balance crime is still far from so. It is an obvious corollary of the relationship that currently links the Gulf Cartel with the militia of Los Zetas, a criminal organization itself today. The latter was born as a mere arm of the cartel has, over time, become aware of their strengths and potential starting to perceive itself as an independent actor. Since President Felipe Calderon, elected in the last election in 2006, launched its offensive against drug traffickers were killed about 28,000. This is an open war with many fronts, against drug dealers and drug traffickers was among them. The President has based its election campaign that brought him to the summit of the state on the drug war. The promise to defeat this scourge is unlikely to be maintained despite the change of course with direct recourse to the army as an anti-drug traffickers. However, in view of future elections in about two years, the best result that the President might get will be a reconciliation between the major contenders in a relative lower level of contrast. This strategy would allow the simultaneous achievement of many advantages at a cost after all relative. First pacify the signs would mean leaving open the flow of illicit money that still has a considerable impact on the economy in Mexico, the President could claim as a personal success and make a future for nomination expendable and ultimately would change the international perception of Mexico today characters took anything but flattering. Certainly it is clear that, once again, the primary demands of the State is ethical and moral ones. Tactically, this strategy translates in an attempt to eliminate from the scene of the cocaine trafficking the Juarez cartel and Los Zetas, in the recent past, have greatly undermined in terms of real power as signs of Sinaloa and the Gulf. Not surprisingly, the police actions of the army, and partly by the federal police have in recent months directed exclusively to strike directly at the top of the Juarez cartel and the Los Zetas. This approach has a purely military basis in the American doctrine crystallized in the Kingpin Act has already been tried in Colombia. Not being able to eradicate crime by measures of social and economic policies, is affecting, with military approach, and clearly identified some of the top organizations in the hope that the leadership failed to prove the latter has weakened to the point where they no longer pose a threat . Obvious that the problem remains unchanged and, in fact, cocaine production in South America has increased in recent years. Today, this approach strikes the two Mexican cartels that, unlike the others, and are the latest to reach the top of the Mexican criminal underworld have more than others, without recourse to extremely common forms of violence and cruelty. The Los Zetas must now deal with it on the one hand the army and federal police and the other a new criminal organization, the New Federation composed by the Sinaloa cartel, the Gulf and the Family Michoacana. Striking new agreements is always possible between different actors; we will see in the coming months the efforts of the Mexican government and criminal factions aimed at the elimination from the market and the Juarez cartel Los Zetas.